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Continuing Economic Reform in the
People's Republic of China: Bankruptcy
Legislation Leads the Way
By SHIRLEY S. CHO:
I. Introduction
Critics view the 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (the -Bank-
ruptcy Law") of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) as an ineffec-
tive piece of legislation passed more for symbolic ends than as a
means to deal with systemic economic problems plaguing China.'
However, the Bankruptcy Law has proven to be one of the most piv-
otal pieces of legislation in modem Chinese history.
The Bankruptcy Law, has served as the main impetus for wide-
reaching reform in all major sectors of the Chinese economy.2 New
regulations have ranged from the implementation of a national social
unemployment insurance system3 to a contract employment system,
4
which fundamentally alters the structure of employer-employee rela-
tions in China. In addition, the government has responded to criti-
cisms of the Bankruptcy Law itself by revising the existing law.5 The
new bankruptcy law, which conforms substantially with international
precepts of bankruptcy, is expected to be passed in the near future. '
This Note will examine the debate surrounding the Bankruptcy
Law from its inception, its controversial substantive provisions, its un-
* Member of the Class of 1997. B.A. University of California, BerkeleQ. 1914.
1. See Jane Macartney, Chinese Can Now Go Bankrupt, Leially, UPI, Nov, . 19,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. See also Nicholas D. Kristof, So:talism Grabs
a Stick- Bankruptcy in China, N.Y. Tzms, Mar. 7, 19S9. at D6.
2. See Henry R. Zheng, Bankruptcy Law of the People's Repubhb of Chinax Principle,
Procedure & Practice, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 633, 65 (19S6).
3. Anne Stevenson-Yang, Re-vamping the Welfare State China Aims tj 11eaktcxn the
Link Between Employers and Benefits, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan. 1. 199o, art.ibk, in
WESTLAW, 1996 WL 8669467.
4. Hillary K. Josephs, Labor Reform in the Workers' State: The Chinese Eperznfce,2
J. CHINEsE L. 201, 204 (1988).
5. See infra part IV.A.
6. Josephine Ma, Revised Bankruptcy Lair Closer to Rcah, S. Crn, MoNrro
PosT, Nov. 2, 1995, at 12.
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successful implementation, and finally its positive repercussions in the
form of the expected passage of the drastically improved bankruptcy
law and labor reform.
H. The 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law
A. Motivations for a Bankruptcy Law in the People's Republic of
China
The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are "the backbone" of
China's "political, economic, and social life."7 The SOEs provide
forty percent of the industrial output for the country," supply goods
for the non-state sector, and employ at least one hundred million
workers.' However, of the estimated one hundred thousand SOEs in
the P.R.C.,10 an official government report estimated that between
twenty and twenty-five percent of SOEs were running at heavy losses
in the early 1980s.1
The inefficiency of SOEs poses a serious threat to the very exist-
ence of the Chinese state in that government subsidies to the finan-
cially troubled SOEs are a tremendous strain on the national budget.' 2
In 1993, subsidies to SOEs totaled three percent of the gross domestic
product,'3 while accounting for sixty percent of the budget deficit.' 4
In an effort to combat the lagging Chinese economy, the govern-
ment implemented a series of economic reforms in the early 1980s
aimed at improving the overall state of the nation.15 The goal of these
reforms was the marketization of the economy with a corresponding
decline in state planning. 16 Because some enterprises were able to
improve their profit margins under these reforms, the disparity be-
tween successful enterprises and those continually running in the red
7. Deborah K. Johns, Reforming the State-Enterprise Property Relationship in the
People's Republic of China: The Corporatization of State-Owned Enterprises, 16 MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 911, 914 (1995).
8. Id.
9. Zheng, supra note 2, at 685.
10. China Stirs Its Sleeping Giants, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 1994, at 53.
11. Zheng, supra note 2, at 385.
12. Johns, supra note 7, at 916-18.
13. Foo Choy Peng, State Sector Holds Key to Future, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, July 7,
1994, at 1.
14. Lincoln Kaye, Fire When Ready, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 23, 1995, at 50, 51.
15. Zheng, supra note 2, at 685.
16. See generally Donald C. Clarke, Regulation and Its Discontents: Understanding
Economic Law in China, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283 (1992).
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highlighted the need for a better method to weed out failing
enterprises.17
Bankruptcy, as a solution, came to the forefront of national de-
bate after Cao Siyuan, widely regarded as the father of Chinese bank-
ruptcy,S published a study entitled "Proposals Concerning Various
Questions on Striving for Scientific Technological Progress and Pro-
moting Economic Development."' 9 According to the study, a bank-
ruptcy law would be the most effective means of eliminating
inefficient SOEs.20
To further support the bankruptcy solution, proponents pro-
claimed that a bankruptcy law would break the "iron rice bowl"21 de-
pendence of China's ailing SOE sector on government bailouts.2 As
the concepts of autonomy and responsibility for economic losses are
absent from a socialist systemP3 SOEs have been immune to the mar-
ket-force consideration that profits are linked to the enterprise's
survivability.24 SOEs have operated under a "soft budget con-
straint."'-5 In essence, they have not needed to be concerned with high
costs as individual employees and managers have never suffered from
the consequences of an inefficient allocation of business assets. A
bankruptcy law was viewed as the necessary incentive for reform in
that profitability of the enterprise would finally be linked to produc-
tivity and quality 6 as the SOEs would finally be held accountable to
market forces.' 7
17. Zheng, supra note 2, at 685.
18. Nicholas C. Howson, Cao Siyuarw A "Responsible Reformer" Sdtcnccd, 8 UCLA
PAC. BASIN U. 267, 269 (1990).
19. Guanyu Zhenggu Keji Jinbu Cujin Jungji Fazhan Ruogan Wcnt De Jtanj [Propos-
als Concerning Various Questions on Striving for Scientific Technological Prto ress and Pro-
moting Economic Development], GONGYE JINGJI GUANLI [INDUS. EC.,N. Mi'sr], No. 3.
1984, cited in Ta-kuang Chang, The Making of the Chinese Bankniptcy Law' A Stuttdy m th e
Chinese Legislative Process, 28 HARV. IN'L L. 333,336 (1987). The study %as ccinducted
at the Technology and Economics Research Center of the State Council. ', hich is a Chi-
nese political think tank. Id.
20. Id.
21. See infra part L.B.3 for a discussion of the "iron rice bowl" policy. Tn term gan-
erally refers to the fact that the worker is guaranteed employment for life by the state.
22. Steven L. Toronto, Note, Bankruptcy of Foreign Enterprises in thre PRC- An Inter-
pretation of the "Rules Concerning Bankniptcy of Foreign Related Companies in the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone". 4 J. CHINESE L. 277, 291 (1990).
23. Zheng, supra note 2, at 685-S6.
24. Clarke, supra note 16, at 295.
25. Id.
26. Toronto, supra note 22, at 292.
27. Clarke, supra note 16, at 284.
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B. Obstacles to Adoption of the Bankruptcy Law
The Bankruptcy Law was one of the most widely debated and
publicized pieces of legislation in Chinese history.28 The amount of
free debate and public access to legislative debates was unprece-
dented.29 Congressional debates were televised to the Chinese pub-
liec. 30 The proposed draft of the law was published in a popular
magazine.3 ' Public opinion polls were taken, and foreign academics
and legislators were invited to a conference on bankruptcy. 32
Significantly, the focus of the debates was largely political and
economic in nature and had little to do with the legal substance of the
draft law itself.33 The most heated arguments involved fundamental
problems of implementing a bankruptcy law in a socialist economy.34
1. Macroeconomic Factors
Several features of the Chinese economy seem anomalous with a
bankruptcy law. Macroeconomic difficulties arise from the fact that
the state's fixed price system often does not accurately reflect market
prices.3" For instance, the coal industry has always posted losses be-
cause the price for raw materials has steadily increased while the coal
price to the Chinese consumer has remained artificially low. 36 Conse-
quently, some argued that the SOEs' profit or loss margin is deter-
mined by the state and is not a real measure of the enterprise's
profitability.37 Additionally, government interference occurs at every
level of decision-making from production to management. 3  Oppo-
nents argued that it would be inherently unfair to hold individual
SOEs or their managers responsible for losses because they have no
control over major aspects of their business related to profits or
losses.3 9
28. Toronto, supra note 22, at 290.
29. 1& at 290; Chang, supra note 19, at 334.
30. Chang, supra note 19, at 333.
31. Id. at 338.
32. Id. at 342-44.
33. Toronto, supra note 22, at 291.
34. Zheng, supra note 2, at 689-97.
35. Peng Xiaohua, Characteristics of China's First Bankruptcy Law, 28 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 373, 374 (1987).
36. Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to do With it? Legal Institutions and Economic
Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 64 (1991).
37. Peng, supra note 35, at 374.
38. Chang, supra note 19, at 355-56.
39. Peng, supra note 35, at 375.
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Reflecting these concerns, the bankruptcy la, became a body of
compromise. It acknowledged that the lack of true market indicators
was a pressing concern for the implementation of bankruptcy in
China.4" The government also assuaged opponents by promising that
it would pass supplemental reforms to grant SOEs and managers
greater autonomy4' as well as to restructure the fixed-price system.4 2
2. Bankruptcy as Incongruous with Socialist Precepts
Socialist ideology depicts bankruptcy as an inherently capitalist
feature.43 The fact that a SOE theoretically could not be bankrupt
was socialism's claim to superiority over capitalism.44 Therefore, ac-
cepting a bankruptcy law was viewed by some as a tacit admission of
the flaws of the socialist system 45
Scholars were the first to minimize ideological inconsistencies be-
tween the concepts of bankruptcy and socialism.4b One theorist rea-
soned that since socialism encourages healthy competition,
bankruptcy was simply a means to foster a competitive atmosphere
among SOEs.47 Another proponent argued that in order for socialism
to progress, eliminating unhealthy SOEs was essential.4 A third the-
orist proposed that socialist systems should be able to utilize aspects
of capitalism to their own socialistic ends. 49 These theories coincided
with the willingness of legislators to associate the failure of an enter-
prise with the individual and not with the socialist structure as a
whole.50
3. Threat to the "Iron Rice Bowl"
The "iron rice bowl" policy is considered by the government to be
the cornerstone of socialism.51 It is written in the Chinese Constitu-
40. Id. at 376-77.
41. Chang, supra note 19, at 356.
42. Zheng, supra note 2, at 691.
43. Toronto, supra note 22, at 290.
44. Zheng, supra note 2, at 6S9.
45. Jonathan L. Flaxer, Bankruptcy in China, Am. BANgR. Isr. J, June 13, 134. at
24.
46. Zheng, supra note 2, at 6S9-90.
47. Md
48. Id. at 690.
49. Id
50. Richard J. Goosen, China's Bankruptcy Law: Taking Legal Reform to the Nexrt
Level, E. ASIAN Exac. REP., July 15, 1987, at S.
51. Toronto, supra note 22, at 291.
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tion that workers are guaranteed the right to employment.5 2 The
state's aim has always been to provide "full employment" for all work-
ers.53 Unemployment, in theory, has been nonexistent.54 If a person
is jobless, he is classified as "waiting for a job" and not as
unemployed.
The premise of the iron rice bowl policy is that the worker and
the state are mutually bound to each other; the government provides
for all necessities in the worker's life in exchange for the worker's
service to the state.56 Often, each SOE resembles a small company
town in that all aspects of the worker's life are accommodated.5 7 Not
only are basic amenities such as housing, food, education, day care,
and medical care provided, but entertainment, barber shops, and rec-
reational facilities also are provided.58
As job security has been a trademark feature of socialist sys-
tems,5 9 adopting a bankruptcy law was seen as undermining this basic
promise of economic security.60 As will be discussed in Part V.A. of
this Note, proponents of the Bankruptcy Law were all too aware of
the need to maintain the social equilibrium by providing greater guar-
antees to displaced workers.6 Thus, not only was a provision that
provided for displaced workers adopted,62 corollary social insurance
measures were passed and continue to be passed by the National Peo-
ple's Congress (NPC).63
C. Legislative Goals
The Bankruptcy Law was passed on December 2, 1986,61 after it
was substantially revised three times and heatedly debated by the
52. Id.
53. Lucy A. Williams & Margaret Y.K. Woo, The "Worthy" Unemployed: Societal
Stratification and Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 489-90 (1995).
54. Id. at 490.
55. Id.
56. Stevenson-Yang, supra note 3.
57. Id.
58. Id
59. Josephs, supra note 4, at 204.
60. Toronto, supra note 22, at 291.
61. See infra part V.A.
62. See infra part II.D.9.
63. See infra part V.
64. Zhongua Renmin Congheguo Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Danul Changivu Weiyuan
Hui Gongbao [Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China],(adopted
Dec. 2, 1986 at the 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's
Congress of the Republic of China) [hereinafter 1986 Bankruptcy Law], translated in
[Vol. 19-:739
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NPC.65 The Bankruptcy Law was expressly tailored for China's
unique transitional economy.66
In general, the typical function of legal enactments in China is to
serve as a moral guideline.67 The effectiveness of the laws lies in the
instructive messages conveyed and the ability to mold behavior to
conform to the goals of the law.68 Therefore, the Bankruptcy Law,
rather than being a substantive body of legal work, is considered to be
more of a political statement.69 The Bankruptcy Law was only in-
tended as a proverbial stick to motivate SOEs to become more effi-
cient and thus help revitalize the economy in general"z' Accordingly,
the effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Law was said to be in the mere
threat of bankruptcy.7
D. Notable Provisions of the 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law
1. Preamble
The Law has a distinctly socialist flair, as is evident from the pre-
amble. The preamble contains language that is hortatory in nature
and carries greater significance in terms of the legal and moral mean-
ing attached to it than would be true of a U.S. law.7 As enacted, the
preamble of the Bankruptcy Law states:
This law is enacted to meet the need for development of the
planned socialist commodity economy and for economic reform, to
promote the independence of business management of the enter-
prises under the ownership by the whole people, to strengthen the
system of economic responsibility and democratic management. to
improve business management and economic performance, and to
protect the lawful rights and interests of debtors and creditors.73
The goals of the Bankruptcy Law are listed in descending order of
importance. 74 Whereas an efficient reorganization of the debtor's es-
Henry R. Zheng, The Enterprise Bankruptcy Lan, of the People's Repubic of Cluna Ifor
Trial Use): A Translation, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 733, 733 (19sfi).
65. Ron Alpe, Bankruptcy Lav Passed. E. AsIAN EXEcun\ E REP., July 15, 1987, at 9.
66. Id. at 360. For a detailed overview of the legislative proess of the paafe of this
law, see Chang, supra note 19, at 366.
67. Goosen, supra note 50, at S.
68. Id.
69. Toronto, supra note 22, at 291.
70. Id. at 292.
71. Id.
72. Chang, supra note 19, at 365.
73. 19S6 Bankruptcy Law art. 1, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 733.
74. Chang, supra note 19, at 365.
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tate and protection of creditors' and debtors' rights is one of the fore-
most concerns in the United States Bankruptcy Code, China's
Bankruptcy Law places minimal significance on these factors.75
2. Applicability
Whether or not the Bankruptcy Law would encompass foreign
enterprises was debated at length.76 The Law was held ultimately to
apply only to SOEs, and not to foreign investment enterprises.77 As
foreign investment enterprises are governed under different laws than
SOEs, many of the proposed Bankruptcy Law provisions, such as pun-
ishment of management, would be difficult to apply uniformly.' 8
To a large extent, foreign investment enterprises in China operate
under normal market forces where there are no ideological difficulties
in allowing enterprises to go bankrupt. 79 As foreign investment enter-
prises were already subject to more market-based bankruptcy provi-
sions,80 it seemed superfluous to include them in the Bankruptcy Law.
3. Definition of a Bankrupt Enterprise
Any commonly accepted market definition of bankruptcy would
have proved disastrous in the Chinese context.81 The result would
have been the bankruptcy of at least one quarter of the SOEs.61
Therefore, the standard for determining bankruptcy could not be
based on the enterprise's ratio of assets to liabilities, but had to be
based on a more amorphous concept.8 3 Article 3 of the Bankruptcy
Law states, "Enterprises that sustain serious loss due to inappropriate
management and that are unable to pay off debts that mature will be
declared bankrupt in accordance with the provisions of this law."4
75. See Debra L. Baker, Bankruptcy-The Last Environmental Loophole?, 34 S. Tx.
L. REv. 379, 381 (1993).
76. Chang, supra note 19, at 361.
77. 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 2, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 733. "The law
applies to enterprises under the ownership of the whole people." Id. The "whole people"
refers to the State-owned enterprises. Id. at n.1.
78. Chang, supra note 19, at 361-62.
79. Zheng, supra note 2, at 697.
80. Id.
81. Chang, supra note 19, at 359. The Shenyang Provisions identified SOE bankruptcy
as when "debts exceed the 'total amount of property owned by it (including fixed assets,
working capital, money or objects owed to it, etc.)."' Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 359-60.
84. 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 3, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 733-34.
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Thus, the gauge for determining bankruptcy in China is whether or
not timely payment of debts can be made. s5
However, two significant exceptions to the general definition of
bankruptcy were carved out to accommodate concerns by the opposi-
tion.86 Businesses that fail through no fault of their own due to exter-
nal forces are not eligible to declare bankruptcy. ' Furthermore, if the
enterprise will be able to pay off its debts within six months after de-
claring bankruptcy because it has found a guarantor or if it is one that
is deemed to have an important impact on the economy, such as a
public utility, it is not eligible to declare bankruptcy. ' Under this ex-
ception, the government has leeway to continue to subsidize the SOE
so that the enterprise can cover its operating costs and avoid
bankruptcy.8 9
4. Filing for Bankruptcy and Government Retention of Control
The government essentially determines when bankruptcies will
be allowed by retaining direct control over the filing process.' ' Volun-
tary petitioners must first obtain consent from their governing depart-
ment before the petition will be approved.91 The debtor's governing
department may also petition the court on its own for the bankruptcy
of the enterprise.92 As mentioned previously, the government is free
to thwart the bankruptcy through other means, such as by subsidizing
or guaranteeing the enterprise's losses.93
5. Reorganization, Reconciliation, and Liquidation
While either debtor or creditor may file for liquidation, reorgani-
zation is possible only when the governmental authority in charge of
the debtor requests a reorganization and both the creditors and the
court agree. 4 As reorganization is only discussed in the context of the
involuntary petition brought by the state, voluntary petitioners may
85. Chang, supra note 19, at 359-60.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 3, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 733-34.
89. Chang, supra note 19, at 360.
90. Douglas Boshkoff & Yongxin Song, China's New , Bankruptcy La;:,. A Translation
and Brief Introduction, 61 AM. BANKR. LJ. 359, 361 (1987).
91. Id.; 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 8, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 734.
92. 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 17, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 736.
93. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 90, at 361.
94. 1986 Bankruptcy Law arts. 17-19, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 736.
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not request reorganization themselves. 95 Significantly, the Bank-
ruptcy Law does not state the grounds by which creditors may oppose
the government's request for reorganization nor does it specifically
authorize the People's Court to reject the state's request for
reorganization.96
At the same time, the Bankruptcy Law encourages the debtor to
file a "conciliation" proposal after the petition for reorganization has
been filed.9 7 The conciliation agreement, if agreed upon by the credi-
tors and approved by the court, terminates the bankruptcy. 98 How-
ever, should the parties fail to reach reconciliation, the Bankruptcy
Law is unclear as to how the court shall proceed.99
In general, reconciliation between the parties is highly en-
couraged and the role of the judiciary has been greatly de-empha-
sized.100 Should the debtor fail to comply with the conciliation
agreement before the two year time limit for reorganization, the
debtor will be declared bankrupt, and within fifteen days, the court
will form a liquidation group comprised of various government offi-
cials to distribute the estate's assets.1 1
6. Punishment of Corporate Management for Business Failure
Drafters of the 1986 Bankruptcy Law were disappointed to learn
that Western bankruptcy laws do not typically contain provisions for
punishing mismanagement.102 In capitalist systems, however, this is
unnecessary as managers are held accountable by market forces in the
form of dismissal by the board of directors or refusal of banks to pro-
vide loans for future capital. 10 3 In China, managers have been im-
mune to market forces as they have been able to rely on government
bail-outs. Therefore, accountability of corporate management was
seen as essential to economic reform. 1 4 Thus, one of the major goals
95. 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 17, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 736. See also
HENRY R. ZHENG, CHINA'S CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW 178 (1988).
96. ZHENG, supra note 95, at 178.
97. 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 18, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 736.
98. Id, art. 19, at 736.
99. ZHENG, supra note 95, at 178.
100. Toronto, supra note 22, at 289.
101. 1986 Bankruptcy Law arts. 22, 24, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 736-37.
102. Chang, supra note 19, at 366.
103. Id
104. Id. See also AIpe, supra note 65.
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of the Bankruptcy Law was to force managers to take greater respon-
sibility for business failures. 05
Under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Law, entitled "Declaration of
Bankruptcy and Liquidation," Article 42 subjects managers and su-
pervising government officials to "administrative penalties" if the in-
vestigating auditing state agency determines that the managers bear
the responsibility for the business failure.'c6 In addition, state manag-
ers can be held criminally liable if their negligence leads to serious loss
of state property. 0 7 Again, the underlying premise for enacting this
provision was not actually to punish the managers but to provide suffi-
cient incentive to improve their organizations.US
7 State Protection for Displaced Workers
Finally, in an attempt to make the Bankruptcy Law more amena-
ble to the workers' needs,109 the Law contains a provision that pro-
vides workers protection against displacement." Article 4 states that
the government will provide new employment to displaced workers of
bankrupt enterprises and will "ensure" that "basic living necessities"
are provided during the period of displacement."' In addition, far-
reaching labor reform measures were passed prior to the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Law on July 12, 1986 by the State Council. 12
E. Implementation
As is the case with most new Chinese laws, the government used
extreme caution before implementing the Bankruptcy Law on a na-
tional level." 3 Prior to adoption, the Law was implemented on a trial-
run basis in select localities." 4 In addition, the Law was enforced for
a period of three months after the enactment."- As a precursor to
implementation, laws granting greater autonomy to the SOEs re-
quired passage. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Law did not become offi-
cially enacted until November 1, 1988 after the Law Governing
105. Chang, supra note 19, at 366. See also Alpe, supra note 65, at 9.
106. 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 42, translated in Zheng, supra note 64. at 740.
107. Id.
108. Alpe, supra note 65, at 9.
109. Chang, supra note 19, at 368-70.
110. 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 4, translated in Zheng, supra note 64, at 734.
111 Id.
112. See infra part V.
113. Goosen, supra note 50, at 8.
114. Id.
115. IdM
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Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (the "Industrial
Enterprise Law") was passed."16
I. Aftermath: Criticisms Abound
A. Criticisms of the Bankruptcy Law Provisions
Critics of the Bankruptcy Law charge it with being vague on sev-
eral points. First, the standard for bankruptcy is vague. 117 For in-
stance, there is no criteria to establish what constitutes "heavy
debts." 8
Second, the Bankruptcy Law has no provisions dealing with pref-
erences among creditors" 9 since most assets are state-owned and
therefore are nontransferable to creditors.' 20 Also, secured property
is excluded from the estate's assets. 2' While this may be beneficial to
secured creditors, it will usually have the effect of depriving unsecured
creditors of any value in the debtor's estate.122
In addition, there is a dual standard regarding when creditors, as
opposed to debtors, may petition for bankruptcy. While a creditor
may file whenever the debtor cannot pay its mature debts, 23 the
debtor may only fie if the heavy debts result from mismanagement.
124
Furthermore, the two year deadline by which the estate must com-
plete a reorganization may be unnecessarily rigid and force debtors
into liquidation merely because they are unable to comply with the
deadline. 25
Other criticisms arise from the attempted implementation of the
Bankruptcy Law itself. Because of the time lag between the declara-
tion of bankruptcy and any action toward reorganization or liquida-
tion, fraudulent transfers have occurred. 26 There also have been
reports of difficulties in relocating workers, conflicts of interest be-
116. Id.
117. Pan Qi, Bankruptcy Law: A Newborn in China, 4 CHINA L. REP. 41, 44 (1988).
118. Id. The Law Governing Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People [here-
inafter Industrial Enterprise Law] was to afford the SOEs autonomy vis-a-vis the state. See
id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 1986 Bankruptcy Law art. 7, Zheng, supra note 64, at 734.
124. Id, arts. 3, 8, at 733-34.
125. Qi, supra note 117, at 44.
126. Rowena Tsang, State-run Companies Fake Bankruptcy to Avoid Debt, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Nov. 14, 1994, at 10.
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tween claimants to the liquidation, and collusion between the debtors
and governmental departments who transfer assets before declaring
bankruptcy. 27
B. Reluctant Use of the Bankruptcy Law
The bulk of the criticisms, however, lie not with the substance of
the Law, but rather with the government's reluctance to use the Law.
As many as forty-five percent of the SOEs still run at a heavy loss.'2 "
In 1991, SOEs reported the highest recorded losses, an estimated
thirty-one billion yuan (US$5.7 billion) since the founding of the
P.R.C. in 1949.129 Chinese economists estimate that ten percent of
SOE production has come to a complete standstill.'u
Government subsidy of the SOEs has been cited as the largest
roadblock to China's economic competitiveness in the world market
as well as the largest drain on the government's budget.13t In 1992
alone, state subsidies amounted to US$90 billion.'32 In 1988, subsidies
to SOEs constituted thirteen to fifteen percent of the national budget
allocation.133 It is estimated that only one-third of the SOEs now op-
erating would be able to survive without the aid of government subsi-
dies.'3 In addition, government bail-out of SOE debt is cited as the
cause 135 of rampant double-digit inflation in China.12 1'
Although at least one-third of the SOEs (approximately thirty
thousand) are acknowledged by Chinese government officials as being
127. Daniel Kvan, Move to Help Firms Go Bust, S. CHsm, MONINGt~ PoT.- Dec. 11,
1995, at 9.
128. China Will Soon Let Failing Public Firms Go Bankrupt, AGENCE FP.-PRESSE, Ozt.
19, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 9627045. According to the State Economic
and Trade Commission, 41% of China's SOEs are running in the red. Catherine Bolgar,
Blackouts in Ukraine, WALL ST. J. IW'L WORLD WI!RE, Dec. 30, 1994, at A4
129. Chinese State Sector Posts Record Loss, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE. Mar. 24, 192, avad-
able in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 8465822.
130. Rajiv Chandra, Real Estate Deals to Save Sick State Units, I-rRE-Pl-ss SER'.,
Sept. 13,1994, available in WVESTLAW, 1994 WL 259312. Those sectors %hich have come
to a stand-still are primarily the heavy industrial industries such as coal, textile. and de-
fense industries. Id. In sharp contrast, the non-state-owned sector economy is booming.
Id.
131. China Pledges New Legislation on Bankruptcy, AsIAN VAu. ST. J., an. 9. 1995, at
3.
132. China Stirs Its Sleeping Giants, supra note 10, at 53.
133. Macartney, supra note 1.
134. Chandra, supra note 130.
135. China's Ailing State Firms Need Dose of Bankruptcy. AsiA \VALL Sr. J, Sept. 15,
1994, at 5.
136. China Will Soon Let Failing Public Firms Go Bankrupt, supra note 128.
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bankrupt, only two thousand companies have been permitted to file
for bankruptcy since the passage of the Bankruptcy Law.137 This has
led to criticism that bankruptcy legislation in China is "more bark
than bite.' 138 The Bankruptcy Law is viewed as an ineffective warn-
ing by the government to SOEs and workers. 139 Thus, even though
the Bankruptcy Law was passed in 1986, the concept of bankruptcy is
still a relatively new one in China. 4 °
Understandably, state-owned banks, currently the major credi-
tors of the SOEs, have also been opponents of the Bankruptcy Law."'
Cao Siyuan has even cited banks as the "biggest obstacle to bank-
ruptcy.'1 42 State-owned bank loans comprise as much as ninety-five
percent of the working capital for some SOEs. 4 3 SOEs and the state
banks, upon which they are heavily dependent, are engaged in a "tri-
angular debt" whereby the SOEs, state banks, and the state are linked
together in a cycle of debt exchange.144 One economist estimates that
twenty percent of China's bank assets would be destroyed if all failing
SOEs were declared bankrupt.' 45 In addition, banks fear not being
able to recover full loan amounts from liquidation proceedings. 146
The small number of successful bankruptcies has also been attrib-
uted to excessive interference from governmental agencies. 147 How-
ever, the government has had good reason to use the Bankruptcy Law
sparingly for fear of potential social unrest caused by worker lay-
offs.' 48 To prevent that end, the state has discouraged bankruptcies by
providing economic incentives in the form of lenient grace periods on
interest charges for those profitable SOEs that agree to merge with
137. Bolgar, supra note 128, at A4.
138. Macartney, supra note 1.
139. Id. See also Kristof, supra note 1, at D6.
140. Bankruptcy Law Still New Concept to State Firms, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 18, 1993, at
41.
141. Ld.
142. Bankruptcies Soar as China Faces up to Reality, LLOYDS LIST, Mar. 14, 1995, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 11770748.
143. Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, et al., State-firm Bosses Press for Reforms, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at 1.
144. Joseph Kahn, Officialdom May Thwart China's Bankruptcy Law, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Sept. 15, 1994, at 1.
145. China's Ailing State Firms Need Dose of Bankruptcy, supra note 135, at 5.
146. Bankruptcies Soar as China Faces up to Reality, supra note 142.
147. Kwan, supra note 127, at 9.
148. Bankruptcies Soar As China Faces Up to Reality, supra note 142; City of Bei/ing to
Let State-Owned Firms Fail, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1995, at 8.
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failing SOEs.14 9 Alternatively, the state has simply merged the failing
SOE with a successful SOE without such incentives."" - Needless to
say, this practice has merely masked the underlying inefficiency of the
failing SOE and imposed an additional burden on the healthy SOE.1 '
IV. China's New Bankruptcy Law
A. Ideological Acceptance of Bankruptcy
Amidst these criticisms, it is not surprising that the government
undertook to revise the Bankruptcy Law. The nature of the revisions
represents a hallmark in Chinese governmental ideology in that the
government has recognized and attempted to synchronize the Chinese
economy with international standards of commerce and bank-
ruptcy.15 2 In addition, an increased number of SOEs have simultane-
ously been allowed to successfully file for bankruptcy. 3
However, the primary focus of the government's reform efforts
still remains the revitalization, not the elimination, of the state-owned
sector.154 The new emerging mentality is that it is acceptable to sacri-
fice a few unprofitable SOEs for the betterment of the national econ-
omy as a whole. 155
There has also been a change in the general public perception.
Bankruptcy, as a solution to political and financial woes, is now seen
as a "politically correct solution." 5 6 Cao Siyuan stated: "[fP]eople ac-
cept bankruptcy now, although they have mixed feelings about it ....
There is no alternative. Leftist critics have no solution to offer."1 57
149. China Plans to Submit New Bankruptcy Law, Asvt4 WALL ST. J,, Nov ' . 1945. at
3.
150. Kristof, supra note 1, at D6.
151. 1d.
152. Judge Sid Brooks, China's New Bankruptcy Law, 27 No. 20 Bankr. Ct. Dzcisions
(LRP) 5, Oct. 3, 1995.
153. Bankruptcies Soar As China Faces Up to Realiy. supra note 142,
154. Susan Noakes, Looking for Treasures in Changing China. Banl:rupt, Inflatrn
and Unemployment Were Once Unheard of in China. Then Again, So Were Profit and
Stunning Economic Growth, FIN. Post, Aug. 19, 1995, at 12.
155. City of Beijing to Let State-Owned Firms Fail, supra note 14S. at S.
156. Sheila Tefft, In China It's Politically Correct to Go Broke, Commumst Pary Plans
to Let Ailing State Firms Go Bankrupt and to Help Idled WorL ers, Ctmipsi la' SCL MoN1.
TOR, Nov. 1, 1994, at 7.
157. Bankruptcies Soar As China Faces Up to Realiy, supra note 142.
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B. Congressional Delays
The new bankruptcy law, to be called the "Bankruptcy Law of the
People's Republic of China" 158 (the "New Law") is heralded as "one
of the most important pieces of Chinese legislation in years."' ' The
New Law is on the forefront of Congress' agenda for 1996.11
Lawmakers stated that the old Bankruptcy Law is not able to keep
apace with the transforming economy.161 Unlike the Bankruptcy Law,
the New Law will be premised on China's status as a market economy
and will not be a law geared toward supplementing a planned
economy.162
The Financial and Economic Committee of the NPC began revis-
ing the New Law in March 1994.163 Although the New Law was ex-
pected to be released earlier this year, publication of the New Law has
been postponed due to fierce debates in the NPC.164 While reports
earlier in the year were hopeful that the draft might be submitted for
approval in March 1996, recent reports are skeptical that the passage
of the New Law will occur before the year's end.165 One point of
contention in the NPC is whether the passage of the New Law should
be postponed until a more substantial social insurance law is
passed.' 66
As is the case with most Chinese laws, including the 1986 Bank-
ruptcy Law, revision of the New Law was approved only after a suc-
cessful trial implementation of the proposed bankruptcy provisions. 6 7
The New Law was first implemented in eighteen major industrial cit-
ies.'68 City governments were rewarded with cash infusions if they
designated a list of factories for immediate bankruptcy. 69 The gov-
158. Drafting of New Bankruptcy Law Almost Finished, XIN-tUA ENG. NEWSWIRE,
Nov. 7, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 11963766.
159. Brooks, supra note 152, at 5.
160. China to Revise Bankruptcy Law, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1996, at 22.
161. China Drafts New Bankruptcy Law, XINHUA NEWS AGENCy, Aug. 3, 1994, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 9094885.
162. Drafting of New Bankruptcy Law Almost Finished, supra note 158.
163. Ma, supra note 6, at 12.
164. Josephine Ma, Fierce Debate Over Draft Forces Delay, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 3.
165. d; see also Solvency Law Falters on Bankrupt Ideas, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
May 5, 1996, at 5.
166. Ma, supra note 164, at 3.
167. Tefft, supra note 156, at 7.
168. Kahn, supra note 144, at 1.
169. Id.
[Vol. 19:739
Continuing Economic Reform in the P.R.C.
ernment backed the experiment with USS813 million in funding to
compensate displaced workers and to cover bank losses.""
C. Substantial Changes Expected in the New Bankruptcy Law
The Bankruptcy Law is expected to be substantially changed.171
Modified provisions are said to be drawn directly from foreign bank-
ruptcy laws, including the United States Bankruptcy Code, in an at-
tempt to bring China's bankruptcy law in line with international
standards.172 Members of the International Conference on Bank-
ruptcy Law who examined the third draft of the New Law stated that
the revised Law is "fundamentally sound, comprehensive, and fits well
within the parameters of current bankruptcy systems in other
countries."' 73
The New Law will have a much greater scope. Not only will it
apply to SOEs, it will also apply to all enterprises including state, pri-
vate, and foreign enterprises. 174 "Non-legal person enterprises,"
which include privately owned companies and partnerships, now com-
prise more than fifty percent of the businesses registered in China
with the State Administration for Industry and Commerce.1 75 There-
fore, the broader scope of the New Law is in step with the govern-
ment's promise to reform according to changing market needs.
One drafter stated that the New Law will provide that the gov-
ernment "should not intervene" in the bankruptcy case."" Debtors
will be able to apply to the courts directly for bankruptcy, rather than
through their superior governmental departments. 77 The effect of
this will be to provide greater flexibility to the individual SOEs and
their creditors to resolve all claims without government
interference. 17S
170. Id. For details of an actual experimental implementation, see Chmse Bankrupity
Sends Shock Waves, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 7. 1994. at DS.
171. China to Revise Bankruptcy Lasv, supra note 160, at 22.
172. Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, NPC Date for Bankruptcy Legislation, S. Cm No:-,mIG
PosT. Oct. 11, 1995, at 10.
173. Brooks, supra note 152, at 5.
174. Rowena Tsang, New Bankruptcy Latv by car-End, S. CHINA Mor PMNG Pf,
Mar. 10, 1995, at 4.
175. Chan, supra note 172, at 10.
176. d
177. Id. "Enterprises which cannot pay due liabilities can apply to courts for insol-
vency." Id.
178. Id.
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The New Law will also provide more detailed provisions regard-
ing restructuring and liquidation procedures. 179 An entire chapter on
corporate reorganization is to be added to the New Law. 80 Provi-
sions regarding the order of debtor's claimants will be more clearly
defined. 18' There will also be a guarantee of creditors' rights to as-
sets. 1' In addition, the time frame between filing bankruptcy and re-
organizing or liquidating the estate will be minimized in an effort to
prevent fraudulent transfers.8 3
Despite these advances, the New Law will not entirely abandon
its old premises. The New Law will continue to discourage "the nega-
tive effects of bankruptcies" by encouraging mediation and enterprise
restructuring as opposed to declaring the enterprise bankrupt.1t 4 In
addition, the New Law will devote a separate section to the SOEs to
tailor the New Law toward China's "special needs."' 5 Also, in prac-
tice, merger is still a popular state remedy as redundant industries are
encouraged to consolidate. 8 6
D. Changed Attitude of the State Toward SOEs
Drastic reform of the Bankruptcy Law is possible largely because
the government has taken the attitude that it will no longer tolerate
SOEs that chronically post losses.'87 Prime Minister Li Peng has even
predicted that fully one-third of SOEs will soon be converted'8' into
private companies or forced into bankruptcy in order to quicken the
pace of default, and, in turn, bring the Chinese economy up to par
with internationally competitive economies. 8 9
179. Id.
180. Ma, supra note 164, at 12.
181. See Chan, supra note 172, at 10. Debtor must first pay outstanding claims and
taxes, followed by money owed to banks and other businesses. Id.
182. China Mulls Law Change, VANCOUVER SON, Nov. 8, 1995, at D3.
183. Tsang, supra note 174, at 4.
184. China to Pass New Bankruptcy Law Next Year, AoENCE FR.-PRESSE, Aug. 21,
1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 7846404.
185. Id.
186. Tony Walker, Heavy Brigade Under Assault: The Greatest Test of China's Commit-
ment to Reform Lies in Rationalizing Loss-making State Enterprises, FiN. TIMES, Apr. 26,
1994, at 21.
187. David Ibison, Trials for Money-Losing Firms, China Firms Face Public 'Trials,' S.
CHINA MORNING Pos-r, Jan. 15, 1995, at 12.
188. Under the Corporate Law passed in 1994, which also has provisions dealing with
bankruptcy and mergers, a legal basis is provided to allow SOEs to convert into privately-
run companies. Gao Jin'an, Corporate Law Guides Economy, CHINA DAILY, June 28,
1994, at 13.
189. Teftt, supra note 156, at 7.
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Of the one thousand SOEs targeted for reform, Vice-Prime Min-
ister Wu stated that three hundred enterprises vill be allowed to run
independently without government intervention." ' Also, the govern-
ment continues to simultaneously promote and praise profitable SOEs
while castigating the unprofitable ones.191 For example, the govern-
ment recently announced a highly public plan aimed primarily at hu-
miliating 156 targeted SOEs by liquidating the enterprises in a public
auction. 9 2
As government supervision eases, SOEs have been given the op-
portunity to seek help elsewhere. For instance, SOE managers have
tried to lure foreign investors with little success.'9 3 More promising
alternatives have included raising capital in the public market or form-
ing partnerships with foreign entities. 194
V. The Necessary Precursor. Implementation of Labor
Insurance Laws
A. Fear of Worker Unrest
Under the iron rice bowl labor system, SOEs bear a tremendous
burden to provide for the welfare of their workers, dramatically in-
creasing their operating costs.' 9- The resulting "catch-22" situation is
that workers cannot, for fear of losing their benefits, move to better
employment opportunities; meanwhile, employers are bound by a so-
cial duty to provide for the workers even if the workers are not neces-
sary to the business.' 96 In effect, the employee and employer are
chained together.
The result is that SOEs support a large, redundant labor force."'
An estimated twenty million workers, or seventeen percent of the
work force, employed by SOEs are said to be redundant or surplus
labor. 9  Inefficiency is compounded because the guarantee of work
and benefits eliminates any incentive for workers with respect to the
quality or quantity of their work product.'"
190. Kwan, supra note 127, at 9.
191. China Pledges New Legislation on Bankruptcy, supra note 131, at 3.
192. Ibison, supra note 187, at 12.
193. Chandra, supra note 130.
194. China Stirs Its Sleeping Giants, supra note 10, at 53,
195. Stevenson-Yang, supra note 3.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Chan, supra note 172, at 10.
199. Henry R Zheng, An Introduction to the Labor Law of the People's Republti of
China, 28 HARv. IT'L LJ. 385, 391 (19S7).
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Chinese workers have not been pleased by the threat of termina-
tion to their iron rice bowl existence.200 As economic reforms pro-
gress, there have been reports of increased worker activism in the
form of strikes, work actions,20 1 and attempts to form unauthorized
trade unions.202
It is widely acknowledged that the social security system requires
improvement before the newly revised provisions can take effect203
and that a major problem with enforcing the Bankruptcy Law has
been the "absence of a unified social welfare package." 2 4 Without
the protection of a support system, bankruptcy may lead to social in-
stability.205 Support services for employment relocation must be im-
proved.20 6 Otherwise, as Chinese Vice Premier Zhu Rongji stated
"the consequences would be unthinkable. 20 7 The Central Committee
of the NPC stated that maintaining social equilibrium while imple-
menting marketization is its primary goal for the 1 9 9 0 S.20s Therefore,
any progress that is made in the bankruptcy arena will most likely be
slow as government officials tread lightly due to fears of urban
unrest.2
09
B. Nationalization Efforts
Fear of displaced worker backlash led some SOEs to make settle-
ment offers to its workers before declaring bankruptcy as a way of
minimizing the impact of joblessness. 210 Although this method proved
successful in some instances, a broader solution was clearly needed.
To that end, the government has started reform that will shift the
burden of social welfare from the individual SOEs to the national
level.21 The first phase entails turning over operation of facilities pre-
200. James Mann, Echoes of Iran, China Optimists Ignore More Pessimistic Parallels,
RocKY MTN. NEWS, July 3, 1994, at 83A.
201. Williams & Woo, supra note 53, at 490.
202. Mann, supra note 200, at 83A.
203. Tefft, supra note 156, at 7.
204. Bankruptcy Law Still New Concept to State Firms, supra note 140, at 141.
205. I.
206. Bruce Shu, Reformist Vice Premier Sets Out a Vision for China, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Mar. 25, 1992, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 8466037.
207. Ld.
208. Williams & Woo, supra note 53, at 491.
209. Chandra, supra note 130. See also Viewpoint: Great Leaps Forward, BANKER,
Sept. 9, 1994, at 10.
210. Tsang, supra note 174, at 4.
211. Stevenson-Yang, supra note 3; see also China Stirs Its Sleeping Giants, supra note
10, at 53.
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viously run by the bankrupt SOE, such as schools, housing and hospi-
tals to the local government. 2 In effect, the SOEs will no longer be
responsible for caring for employees "from cradle to grave." 213
C. The Social Safety Net
1. Protections for Workers in the New Bankruptcy Law
The New Law will require that proceeds from the sale of state-
granted land in liquidation be distributed to workers either in the
form of a direct compensation in a lump sum or a fund to be used for
retraining and relocating displaced workers.214 United States Bank-
ruptcy Judge Sid Brooks sees two benefits to such a scheme: (1) it will
ease the government's financial burden from the bankruptcy of the
SOE and (2) it will alleviate the fear of bankruptcy and the courts'
reluctance to declare bankruptcies.215
Under the current system, employees are barely given enough
unemployment wages for subsistence, making it all the more difficult
to find new employment.21 6 Thus, the concept of an unemployment
fund would serve as more of a settlement to tide the workers over
until alternative employment can be found.217
2. The July 12, 1986 Labor Reform Regulations
The state passed the most significant regulations in the area of
labor reform on July 12, 1986.218 The July 12, 1986 regulations encom-
passed four areas: contract employment, hiring of workers, termina-
tion of workers and unemployment insurance.21" The regulations
codified what had already existed for six years in many local cities on
an experimental basis.2 0 Among other problems, the government
hoped to address through the labor reforms the inefficient allocation
212. Chan, supra note 172, at 10.
213. China Stirs Its Sleeping Giants, supra note 10, at 53.
214. Chan, supra note 172, at 10.
215. Brooks, supra note 152, at 5.
216. Huang Zhiling, Set Up a Fund to Help Unemployed Workers, CmunN DmLt., De.
3, 1994, at 43.
217. IL
218. Josephs, supra note 4, at 229.
219. Id. at 229. The four regulations passed on July 12, 19S6 are: (1) Proisional Regu-
lations on the Implementation of the Contract Employment System in State Enterprzse,
(2) Provisional Regulations on the Hiring of Workers in State Enterprises, (3) Pro-isional
Regulations on the Dismissal of Workers and Staff for Work Violation in State Entcrpri:-._,
and (4) Provisional Regulations on Unemployment Insurance for Workers. Id.
220. 1,L at 230.
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of labor supply, poorly trained work force, and favoritism of status-
based employees.22'
3. Introduction of the Contract Employment System
The government's first step in its labor reform efforts was to alter
the structure of the relationship between employer and employee by
mandating a contract systemt2 of employment.223 As foreign invest-
ment enterprises in China had long been operating under a contract
employment system,2 4 the government's introduction of contract em-
ployment served to validate its efforts to bring China's overall econ-
omy in line with modem market economies as well as to further erode
the iron rice bowl mentality325
The contract employment system was approved for mandatory
implementation only after experimentation in select cities showed that
contract employment resulted in higher worker productivity and de-
creased rates of absenteeism.226 Implementation was also facilitated
by academic critics who quickly distinguished the contract employ-
ment system from the "wage labor system," considered a hallmark of
capitalist societies.2 7 Contract employment was said to merely for-
malize the existing relationship between the employer and employee
in accordance with the socialist labor system.228
One of the goals of the contract employment system was to create
a mobile labor force that could better accommodate industry de-
mand.2 9 Under the 1986 Regulations, employers and employees have
greater freedom to enter into and terminate employment relation-
ships. 3 ° The benefit to workers is that they are encouraged to bargain
and resign while managers have incentive to negotiate terms of em-
ployment rather than forcing terms through administrative means. 231
Workers are free to leave employers at the end of the contractual term
221. Id at 209-19.
222. See id. at 264-70 for a text of the contract employment system.
223. Zheng, supra note 199, at 393. The State Council passed the contract employment
regulation, officially known as the Interim Regulations on the Implementation of Labor
Contracts in State-Owned Enterprises [hereinafter Labor Contract Regulations]. Id. at 394.
224. Id at 385.
225. Id. at 391.
226. Id. at 391-92.
227. Id at 393.
228. I&
229. Id- at 391.
230. Josephs, supra note 4, at 220-21, 231-54.
231. Zheng, supra note 199, at 430.
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and find employment where there may be a demand, -2 thus hopefully
alleviating the redundant-worker problem.33 3
4. Unemployment Insurance
The 1995 Labor Law is another hallmark in the arena of labor
reform. 34 The new labor law establishes five mandatory funds so that
both employer and employee must contribute.--' One of these is an
unemployment insurance fund.3 + Unemployment Insurance, like the
contract labor system, serves a dual purpose. 7 Not only does it ap-
pease displaced workers and thereby ensure social stability, but it also
serves to encourage businesses to layoff redundant workers.221 In ad-
dition, the 1995 Labor Law applies to both foreign and state-owned
enterprises. 239
It is important to note that social insurance and social welfare are
two distinct categories of social aid in China.24' " Social insurance is
comprised of the five mandatory funds under the 1995 Labor Law
while social welfare consists of government subsidies and emergency
relief.24' Social welfare in China has been intact since 1954 and is
commonly associated with the iron rice bowl system of the SOEs. 42
Although implementation of the mandatory funds is still in the
preliminary stages, the Unemployment Insurance Fund gives the most
significant worker protection yet.2 43 Under the Unemployment Insur-
ance Fund, unemployed workers are entitled to compensation without
distinction as to their status or reason for unemployment.2 '4 The
worker is entitled to compensation for two years based on a fixed per-
centage of the worker's wage.245 Workers who have been employed
232. Josephs, supra note 4, at 209.
233. ld.
234. Stevenson-Yang, supra note 3.
235. Id.
236. Id. Other mandatory funds include: pension, medical, accident or dis3bility. and
maternity. Id.
237. Williams & Woo, supra note 53, at 493.
238. Id.
239. Chan Wai-Fong, Social Security Bill Nears Completion, S. CHMA MoNrGc, Po"r,
Nov. 26, 1994, at 9. However, the Labor Law does not apply to China's large rural %ork-
force sector, self-employed workers or individual business owners, Id. The lkf-cmploy .d
workers or individual business owners may participate in the program %oluntarily. Id.
240. Stevenson-Yang, supra note 3.
241. Id
242. Id.
243. Id
244. Josephs, supra note 4, at 248.
245. Id. at 248-49.
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with the employer for less than five years receive compensation for
only one year.246 Employee contributions are based on a percentage
of their yearly wages.2 47 Although starting at two percent, the govern-
ment plans to increase the total contribution to eight percent over the
next six years.248 Corporate employers are expected to contribute a
minimum of fourteen percent of their income.249
VI. Conclusion
Bankruptcy in China has had a tenuous existence. To a large ex-
tent, bankruptcy legislation has reflected political difficulties in
China's economic transition to a market economy. Initially, the gov-
ernment acted conservatively and authorized a minimal amount of
bankruptcies for fear of political and social opposition. However, as
the government has become increasingly determined to make the Chi-
nese economy competitive on an international scale, it has become
adamant in its attempts to transform the inefficient state-owned
sector.
Both the 1986 and the New Bankruptcy Law have been instru-
mental in the government's reform efforts. When applied seriously,
the New Law will force out inefficient SOEs, reduce the redundant
worker problem and better allocate the labor supply. Before this can
occur, the government has correctly surmised that several aspects of
Chinese law need to be addressed. While this Note has emphasized
the progress in labor reform, the government has also been forced to
examine other areas dealing with asset ownership and governance of
SOEs, among other things.
The New Bankruptcy Law embodies the government's firm re-
solve to implement market reforms, as many of the provisions es-
poused in the New Law will be based on market principles. As China
continues on a path toward economic reform and marketization, fun-
damental precepts of the socialist system will continue to be chal-
lenged and bankruptcy legislation will be at the forefront of the
change.
246. 1& at 249.
247. Stevenson-Yang, supra note 3.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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